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Craig’s Kalām Cosmology 
 
Let ‘reality’ refer to the largest whole every eligible part of which is connected to our 
eligible part of reality under a privileged external relation (think: ‘a is causally related 
to b’). We suppose that this privileged external relation has an analogue that is 
directed, so that some eligible parts of reality are anterior to other eligible parts of 
reality under the analogue of the privileged relation (think: ‘a is causally anterior to 
b’). We do not suppose that this analogue relation is total: we allow that there are 
non-overlapping eligible parts of reality such that neither is anterior to the other under 
the analogue relation. However, as noted, we do suppose that any two non-
overlapping eligible parts of reality are connected by a chain of non-overlapping 
eligible parts of reality under the relation itself. Moreover, we suppose that each 
eligible part of reality is such that none of its parts is anterior to any other of its parts 
under the analogue relation, and also such that there are no other eligible parts of 
reality to which it fails to be connected under the relation itself. 
 
To illustrate this rather abstract account of reality—and to exhibit a justification for its 
complexity—we consider a concrete example. Pretend that reality is exhausted by an 
instance of a standard general relativistic universe that originates in an initial 
singularity. Eligible parts of reality will be maximal sub-parts all of whose parts have 
only space-like connections to each other. These eligible parts will stand in causal—
light-like and time-like—relations to one another. If, for example, the initial 
singularity is a singular surface, it may be that there are non-overlapping eligible parts 
of reality that are causally related to one another only in virtue of the fact that they 
trace back to non-overlapping regions of that initial singular surface. (Among the 
reasons why we can only pretend that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard 
general relativistic universe that originates in an initial singularity, perhaps the most 
important is that we should not immediately rule out the possibility that reality has 
parts ‘on the other side of the initial singularity’ from which our observable universe 
has arisen. We suppose only that, if reality does have parts ‘on the other side of the 
initial singularity’ from which our observable universe has arisen, then there are least 
analogues of causation and space-like relation that determine the extent of reality.) 
 
There are many hypotheses that one can frame about the overall ‘shape’ taken by 
reality under our privileged external relation. We begin by distinguishing the 
following two very general competing hypotheses: 
 
Infinite Regress: Under the external relation, each eligible part of reality which is 
posterior to some non-overlapping eligible part of reality belongs to a chain of 
non-overlapping eligible parts of reality which satisfies the following condition: 
for each member of the chain, there is an anterior (and not posterior) member of 
the chain that does not overlap with any other members of the chain. 
 
Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of 
reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and 
not posterior to any eligible part of reality.  
 
In the subsequent discussion, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all of 
the many competing hypotheses that one might frame about the general shape of 
reality under the privileged external relation. 
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The Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses, 
depending upon the modal status of the initial boundary: 
 
Contingent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest 
eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part 
of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that 
smallest eligible part of reality exists contingently. 
 
Necessary Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest 
eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part 
of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that 
smallest eligible part of reality exists of necessity. 
 
The Initial Boundary hypothesis also divides into two competing sub-hypotheses 
depending upon the ontological status of the initial boundary: 
 
Immanent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible 
part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality 
and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest 
eligible part of reality is continuous in nature with the rest of reality 
 
Transcendent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest 
eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part 
of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that 
smallest eligible part of reality is radically different in nature from the rest of 
reality. 
 
And the Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses 
depending upon the psychological status of the initial boundary: 
 
Impersonal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest 
eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part 
of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that 
smallest eligible part of reality has no personal—mental, psychological—
properties 
 
Personal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible 
part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality 
and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest 
eligible part of reality has personal—mental, psychological—properties. 
 
Given only the distinctions that we have drawn to this point, we now have eight 
competing versions of the Initial Boundary hypothesis, and we also have the 
competing Infinite Regress hypothesis. Are there reasons to prefer one of these nine 
hypotheses above all of the others? 
 
Theists suppose that the answer to this question is affirmative: we should prefer 
Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary above the other eight hypotheses. 
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that naturalists suppose that the answer to the 
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question is affirmative: it may well be that naturalists suppose that we have no reasons 
for preferring any one of Infinite Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial 
Boundary, and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary to the other two 
hypotheses in this group. However, naturalists will hold that at least one of Infinite 
Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary, and Contingent Immanent 
Impersonal Initial Boundary is preferable to all of the six remaining alternatives; and 
if naturalists are undecided between two or more of the hypotheses that are congenial 
to naturalism, then they will hold that all of the hypotheses between which they are 
undecided are preferable to the remaining six alternatives. 
 
In the ensuing discussion, we shall restrict our attention to the dispute between theists 
and naturalists about the standing of the four hypotheses singled out in the preceding 
paragraph. As before, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all other 
disputes concerning the relative standing of the nine hypotheses that we have 
identified, and concerning the many hypotheses that we have not even attempted to 
frame. (It is, for example, an interesting question what pantheists should say about the 
relative standing of our nine hypotheses. But that is not a question properly taken up 
in the present context.) 
 
One way of reading William Lane Craig’s voluminous writings on the kalām 
cosmological argument is as the construction of a case for the superiority of 
Necessary Initial Boundary to both Infinite Regress and Contingent Initial Boundary.  
While Craig’s writings focussed solely on the kalām cosmological argument offer no 
means of deciding between Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary and 
Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary, the success of the case developed 
in those writings would remove Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent 
Impersonal Initial Boundary from the contest, or, at any rate, would provide some 
non-negligible but defeasible reason to prefer Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial 
Boundary to Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. 
Consequently, naturalists have good reason to think carefully about the case that 
Craig develops: if his case is compelling, then naturalists are obliged to adopt 
Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. We shall start with the case that 
Craig develops against Infinite Regress. 
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Craig provides two quite different kinds of objections to Infinite Regress. On the one 
hand, he objects on philosophical grounds: in his view, Infinite Regress is 
metaphysically impossible. On the other hand, Craig objects on empirical grounds: in 
his view, Infinite Regress is ruled out—or, at any rate, rendered implausible—by 
contemporary scientific cosmology. In the present section, we shall consider 
philosophical objections to Infinite Regress; in the next section, we shall turn to 
empirical objections. 
 
Craig typically divides the philosophical considerations that he advances against 
Infinite Regress into two parts. On the one hand, he advances philosophical 
considerations against the suggestion that reality has—or, indeed, could have—
infinitely many non-overlapping parts; and, on the other hand, he advances 
philosophical considerations against the view that, allowing that reality has infinitely 
many non-overlapping parts, reality is—or, indeed, could be—so arranged that it has 
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infinitely many non-overlapping parts that belong to a single beginningless chain 
under the privileged external relation. (Note that Infinite Regress entails that reality 
has infinitely many non-overlapping parts that belong to a single beginningless chain 
under the privileged external relation; indeed, Infinite Regress entails that every part 
of reality that is posterior to some part of reality belongs to a beginningless chain 
under the privileged external relation.) 
 
Craig’s First Philosophical Argument: Craig discussion of the suggestion that reality 
could have infinitely many non-overlapping parts has two major components. First, 
Craig considers the acceptability of the standard, classical conception of infinity, as 
enshrined, for example, in Zermelo-Frankel set theory. Second, Craig considers the 
possibility that this standard classical conception of infinity is instantiated in reality, 
as implied by Infinite Regress. It should be noted that Craig also gives very extensive 
discussion of the ontological commitments of standard, classical mathematics, 
because he thinks that Platonists hold that mathematical entities are ‘part of the real 
world’. However, I take it that this is a mistake: while Platonists may suppose that 
mathematical entities ‘exist in Platonic Heaven’, they do not think that the privileged 
external relation makes any connections between Platonic Heaven and reality. Hence, 
even if Platonism should be preferred to nominalism, conceptualism, formalism, 
fictionalism, and so forth, that does nothing to advance the cause of Infinite Regress. 
 
On the question of the acceptability of the standard, classical conception of infinity, 
Craig makes much of the fact that there have been brilliant proponents of 
constructivism, intuitionism, and finitism: Kronecker, Brouwer, Nelson, Feferman, 
and the like. However, it is worth noting that constructivism, intuitionism and finitism 
are all very much minority positions; the overwhelming majority of working 
mathematicians accept standard, classical mathematics. Moreover, this is not just a 
matter of fashion: there are good reasons for preferring standard, classical 
mathematics to the alternatives. In particular, it should be observed that, in order to 
adopt one of the alternative views, one needs to give up parts of classical logic—and, 
if one does give up parts of classical logic, then this has consequences for the 
arguments that one can make elsewhere. (To give one example: the standard proofs of 
the Hawking-Penrose theorems that establish that, under plausible assumptions, 
singularities are generic in general relativistic space-times, are non-constructive. Until 
constructive proofs of these theorems are provided, those who renounce classical 
mathematics are not entitled to rely upon these theorems.) While Craig himself may 
have a distinct reason for rejecting alternatives to classical mathematics—namely, that 
only classical mathematics could do justice to God’s mathematical knowledge—it 
seems pretty clear that acceptance of classical mathematics is very well justified on 
naturalistically acceptable grounds. 
 
On the question of the possibility that the standard, classical conception of infinity is 
instantiated in reality, Craig objects that the assumption, that it is possible for the 
standard, classical conception of infinity to be instantiated in reality, has absurd 
consequences. In particular, Craig argues that, if it is possible for the standard, 
classical conception of infinity to be instantiated in reality, then, for example, it is 
possible for there to be a hotel with infinitely many rooms, for all of the rooms to be 
occupied, and yet for the proprietor to accommodate a new guest by moving each 
guest into an adjacent room. There are at least two kinds of critical responses that 
might be made to arguments of this kind. On the one hand, it might be denied that it is 
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absurd to suppose that a new guest could be accommodated in a hotel in which every 
room is occupied by the expedient of moving each guest into an adjoining room. Of 
course, we know that this can’t be done in a hotel with only finitely many rooms—but 
how can that be a reason for thinking that there could not be a hotel with infinitely 
many rooms? On the other hand, it might be argued that there could not be a hotel 
with infinitely many rooms, and yet denied that this somehow casts doubt on Infinite 
Regress. 
 
Which kind of response should be preferred? Well, that depends upon the 
assumptions that we make about the kind of possibility that is at issue. If we suppose 
that what is at issue is something like clear and consistent conceivability—can we 
make a model of, or imagine, the scenario in question—then we can happily make the 
former response. However, if we suppose that what is at issue is some kind of 
metaphysical possibility whose nature might be cognitively opaque to us, then we 
might well prefer to opt for the latter response. Suppose, for example, that we think 
that all metaphysically possible universes are governed by the same laws and 
boundary conditions as our universe: there is a finite limit on the speed at which 
signals can be transmitted in vacuo, there is a finite limit beyond which any mass 
collapses under the force of gravitational attraction, there is a fixed lower bound to the 
size of a hotel room, and so forth. In that case, clearly, there cannot be a hotel that 
satisfies the demands of Craig’s story. And, moreover, this is not just a feature of the 
chosen example: the same can be said about each aspect of each of the stories that 
Craig takes to show that the assumption that it is possible for the standard, classical 
conception of infinity to be instantiated in reality, has absurd consequences. But, of 
course, the considerations that here rule it impossible for there to be entities that 
satisfy the demands of Craig’s stories plainly do not rule out Infinite Regress. 
 
The upshot of this discussion is that Craig’s ‘first philosophical argument’ provides 
no good reason for ruling out the claim that reality has infinitely many non-
overlapping parts. Of course, that’s not to say that we have here given good reason for 
thinking that it is possible that reality does have infinitely many non-overlapping parts. 
However, it is worth noting that, Craig’s animadversions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, it has been the case throughout recorded history that there are many 
people—philosophers, natural scientists, and so forth—who suppose that it is possible 
that reality does have infinitely many non-overlapping parts. Indeed, it has been the 
case throughout recorded history that there are many people who suppose that it is 
possible that our local part of reality has infinitely many non-overlapping parts: 
infinitely many non-overlapping spatial regions, infinitely many stars, an infinite 
succession of past stages, and so on. Moreover, it seems to me that an unprejudiced 
view of the historical record plainly demonstrates that the reasons that people have 
given for thinking that it is possible that our local part of reality has infinitely many 
non-overlapping parts are collectively no worse than the reasons that people have 
given for thinking that it is impossible that our local part of reality has infinitely many 
non-overlapping parts. So, at the very least, there is good reason to be less than 
overwhelmed by Craig’s ‘first philosophical argument’. 
 
Craig’s Second Philosophical Argument: Craig’s discussion of the suggestion, that, 
allowing that reality has infinitely many non-overlapping parts, reality could be so 
arranged that it has infinitely many non-overlapping parts that belong to a single 
beginningless chain under the privileged external relation, turns centrally on his claim 
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that this suggestion has absurd consequences that can be brought out through the 
discussion of cases that plainly would be possible if it were  possible for reality to be 
so arranged that it has infinitely many non-overlapping parts that belong to a single 
beginningless chain under the privileged external relation. Consider Tristram Shandy, 
who takes a year to plan one day of his life. If the past is infinite, and if Tristram 
Shandy has existed at all times in the past, then it should be possible for Tristram 
Shandy to put down his pen at a particular time, with no part of his life to that point 
remaining unplanned. But it is absurd to suppose that it is possible for Tristram 
Shandy to put down his pen at a particular time, with no part of his life to that point 
remaining unplanned, given that he has existed at all times in an infinite past. 
 
As before, there are at least two different kinds of critical responses that might be 
made to arguments of this kind. On the one hand, it might be denied that it is absurd 
to suppose that it is possible for Tristram Shandy to put down his pen at a particular 
time, with no part of his life to that point remaining unplanned, given that he has 
existed at all times in an infinite past. On the other hand, it might be argued that it is, 
indeed, impossible for there to be a person who has existed at all times in an infinite 
past, and who puts down his pen at a particular time, with no part of his life to that 
point remaining unplanned, but denied that this somehow casts doubt on Infinite 
Regress. 
 
Which kind of response should be preferred? Well, again, that depends upon the 
assumptions that we make about the kind of possibility that is at issue. If we suppose 
that what is at issue is something like clear and consistent conceivability—can we 
make a model of, or imagine, the scenario in question—then we can happily make the 
former response. It is hard to see that there is any barrier to the clear and consistent 
conception—or imagination—of a case in which, at all times, it is true that Tristram 
Shandy is going to put down his pen at a particular time, with no part of his life to that 
point unplanned. (In this case, Tristram Shandy will spend his last year planning his 
last day, his second last year planning his second last day, and so on. As we consider 
years that are more distant in the past, there is a greater gap between the year and the 
day that is planned during that year. Nonetheless, for each day prior to the point at 
which he puts down his pen, there is a year in which he plans that day.) However, if 
we suppose that what is at issue is some kind of metaphysical possibility whose nature 
might be cognitively opaque to us, then we might well prefer to opt for the latter 
response. Suppose, for example, that we think that all metaphysically possible 
universes are governed by the same laws and boundary conditions as our universe: all 
fundamental particles have a finite half life, there is a finite limit beyond which any 
mass collapses under the force of gravitational attraction, there is a fixed upper bound 
to the storage capacity of a human brain, there is a fixed lower bound to the amount of 
matter needed to construct a record of planning for a future day, and so forth. In that 
case, clearly, there cannot be a person who conforms to the demands of Craig’s story. 
And, moreover, this is not just a feature of the chosen example: the same can be said 
about each aspect of each of the stories that Craig takes to show that the assumption, 
that, allowing that reality has infinitely many non-overlapping parts, reality could be 
so arranged that it has infinitely many non-overlapping parts that belong to a single 
beginningless chain under the privileged external relation, has absurd consequences. 
But, of course, the considerations that here rule it impossible for there to be entities 
that satisfy the demands of Craig’s stories plainly do not rule out Infinite Regress. 
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The upshot of this discussion is that Craig’s ‘second philosophical argument’ provides 
no good reason for ruling out the claim that, if reality has infinitely many non-
overlapping parts, then reality could be so arranged that it has infinitely many non-
overlapping parts that belong to a single beginningless chain under the privileged 
external relation. Of course, that’s not to say that we have here given good reason for 
thinking that it is possible that, if reality has infinitely many non-overlapping parts, 
then reality could be so arranged that it has infinitely many non-overlapping parts that 
belong to a single beginningless chain under the privileged external relation. However, 
as we have already noted, it has been the case throughout most of recorded history 
that there are many people who suppose that it is possible that our local part of reality 
has infinitely many past stages. Indeed, no less an authority than Aquinas held that the 
claim that it is possible that our local part of reality has infinitely many past stages 
could only be ruled out on the basis of divine revelation: if God had not given us a 
biblical revelation concerning the finite history of our universe, then we would have 
no way of ruling out the claim that it is possible that our local part of reality has 
infinitely many past stages. (Of course, recent scientific developments effectively rule 
out the claim that it is possible that our local part of reality has infinitely many past 
stages: our local part of reality has a roughly thirteen billion year history beginning 
with the Big Bang. But that consideration takes us beyond Craig’s ‘philosophical 
arguments’ and on to Craig’s ‘empirical argument’.) As before, it seems entirely fair 
to conclude that there is good reason to be less than overwhelmed by Craig’s ‘second 
philosophical argument’. 
 
2 
 
Craig’s empirical argument against Infinite Regress is based on a particular 
interpretation of Big Bang cosmology. In its early incarnations, this empirical 
argument goes as follows.  
 
There are three possible theories of the origin of the universe: the steady state model, 
the oscillating model, and the Big Bang model. The steady state model is ruled out by 
various features of observational cosmology—measurement of the cosmic microwave 
background radiation, etc. The oscillating model is ruled out by evidence from 
observational cosmology that strongly supports the claim that the universe is open, 
and, indeed, strongly supports the claim that the universe is expanding in a run-away 
fashion. But: 
 
The Big Bang model, in which the universe originates in an explosion from a state 
of infinite density, that is, from nothing, provides a simple, consistent and 
empirically sound construction of how the universe began. (The Kalām 
Cosmological Argument, 1979, 117) 
 
The most obvious problem that confronts this argument is that it is simply not true 
that a model in which ‘the universe originates in an explosion from a state of infinite 
density’ is a ‘consistent and empirically sound construction of how the universe 
began’. In particular, on the one hand, we note that this model takes no account of 
quantum theory, even though, on this model, the very earliest part of the universe 
necessarily falls within the domain of quantum theory; and, on the other hand, we 
note that quantum theory has at least as much empirical support as any scientific 
theory that we accept. Assuming that general relativity is not overthrown by a 
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successor theory in the classical domain, the very least that is needed before we can 
start drawing evidence-based conclusions about the origins of the universe is an 
empirically adequate quantum-gravitational model. But, as of the time of writing, that 
is something that we do not have. 
 
Given that we do not have an empirically adequate model of the earliest origins of the 
universe—i.e. of the origins of the universe during the time period in which quantum 
influences would have been important for the global features of the universe—we are 
in no position to provide an evidence-based perspective on questions about the nature 
of reality prior to that time period. Even if we were in a position to suppose that ‘the 
Big Bang model … provides a consistent and empirically sound construction of how 
the universe began’, it is not obvious that we would be well-placed to argue that our 
universe has an absolute beginning in the Big Bang: that would depend upon the view 
that we take about the controversial question of the extendibility of the metric through 
the initial singularity. But, once it is admitted both that the Big Bang model is not ‘a 
consistent and empirically sound construction of how the universe began’ and that we 
do not have any replacement theory that is both consistent and empirically sound, we 
lose any evidence-based grounds that we might have had for making judgments about 
what, if anything, is prior to the time period in which quantum influences would have 
been important for the global features of the universe. 
 
Although this discussion has been very brief, its import is clear: Craig’s empirical 
argument against Infinite Regress is very weak. While it can hardly be said that 
considerations about the Big Bang provide us with strong reasons to accept Infinite 
Regress, it is no less clear that considerations about the Big Bang do not currently 
provide us with good reasons to deny Infinite Regress. If reality has parts ‘on the 
other side of the Big Bang’, then that might be reasonably strong reason for thinking 
that Infinite Regress is true: if our universe is separated from another universe by a 
Big Bang, then why shouldn’t that universe, in turn, be separated from yet another 
universe by a Big Bang, and so on? But, as we have already noted, we currently have 
no good empirical grounds for making a determination one way or the other on the 
question whether reality does have parts ‘on the other side of the Big Bang’. 
 
Given that Craig’s empirical argument establishes neither that Infinite Regress is 
ruled out by empirical considerations nor that Infinite Regress is rendered improbable 
by empirical considerations, and given that Craig’s philosophical arguments establish 
neither that Infinite Regress is ruled out by philosophical considerations nor that 
Infinite Regress is rendered improbable by philosophical considerations, we should 
conclude that, for all that Craig argues, Infinite Regress remains an undefeated 
hypothesis about the overall shape of reality. When we come to compare standing 
hypotheses about the overall shape of reality, Infinite Regress should be invited to the 
contest. 
 
 
3 
 
Craig has provided much less extensive discussion of Contingent Initial Boundary 
than he has of Infinite Regress. From his earliest writings, Craig has insisted that it is 
just obvious that Contingent Initial Boundary is false. 
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[The claim that Contingent Initial Boundary is false] is so obvious … that 
probably no one in his right mind really believes it to be false. … The idea that 
anything … could pop into existence uncaused is so repugnant that most thinkers 
intuitively recognise that it is … incapable of sincere affirmation. …  [Contingent 
Initial Boundary] is too incredible to be believed. … To attack Maimonides and 
Aquinas on this point seems to colour one’s intellectual integrity. … A sincere 
denial of this axiom is well-nigh impossible. … [Contingent Initial Boundary] 
seems intuitively to be really, if not logically, absurd. (The Kalām Cosmological 
Argument, 1979, 141-5) 
 
Given the vehemence of Craig’s rhetoric, one might well suspect that he is not in 
possession of good arguments against Contingent Initial Boundary. This suspicion is 
borne out by an examination of his writings on the topic. In this section, I shall briefly 
examine four types of arguments that Craig has advanced against Contingent Initial 
Boundary; and, of course, I shall argue that none of them is in the least bit persuasive. 
 
1. Generalisation from experience: The first type of argument that Craig advocates 
appeals to the universality of causation. Given that, in our experience, everything that 
comes into existence has a cause of its coming into existence, we have overwhelming 
reason to think that every contingently existing thing has a cause of its existence—
whence it surely follows that Contingent Initial Boundary is false. 
 
Setting aside any quibbles that one might make about the suggestion that it is simply 
given in our experience that everything that we meet in experience has a cause of its 
coming into existence, the obvious response to this argument is that it clearly involves 
an inappropriate over-generalisation. On the basis of experience, the most that we are 
entitled to infer is that all of the kinds of things that we meet in experience have 
causes of their coming into existence. But it would be a huge and unjustified inductive 
leap to suppose that our experience supports the inference that even kinds of things 
that we could not possibly encounter in experience have causes of their coming into 
existence. Since the Initial Boundary of reality—if, indeed, reality does have an initial 
boundary—is plainly a kind of thing that we could not possibly encounter in 
experience, our experience tells us nothing at all about whether or not it has a cause. 
 
2. Against Humean Conceivability: The second type of argument that Craig advocates 
is really an attempt to undermine the theoretical view that it is possible for reality to 
have a contingently existing initial boundary. If we suppose that the kind of 
possibility that is at issue is something like clear and consistent conceivability, then it 
seems plausible to claim that it is possible that reality has a contingently existing 
initial boundary. However, against this claim, Craig says that, at most, clear and 
consistent conceivability establishes that Contingent Initial Boundary is not ruled out 
on analytic or logical grounds. But, on Craig’s view, the fact that we can imagine that 
the universe has a contingently existing initial boundary does not establish that this is 
a ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ possibility. Moreover, on Craig’s view, even though Contingent 
Initial Boundary is not ruled out on analytic or logical grounds, it is still in order to 
insist that this hypothesis is ‘absurd’: ‘for the universe to spring into existence 
uncaused out of nothing seems intuitively to be really, if not logically, absurd’ (The 
Kalam Cosmological Argument, 1979, 145) 
 
 10
As we have already had cause to mention, many philosophers are prepared to accept 
the suggestion that there is a kind of metaphysical possibility whose nature is 
cognitively opaque to us. However, in supposing that there is a kind of metaphysical 
possibility whose nature is cognitively opaque to us, we are supposing, precisely, that 
this kind of possibility is not adequately measured by conceivability, or imagination, 
or intuition, or the like. So, talk about this kind of metaphysical possibility is just not 
properly paired with talk about ‘absurdity’, ‘unintuitiveness’, and the like. We may 
have good theoretical grounds—based on overall judgments about simplicity, 
explanatory scope, fit with data, and so forth—for accepting certain claims about 
metaphysical possibilities and metaphysical impossibilities: but those grounds are not 
adequately captured in talk about ‘what seems intuitively to be really absurd’ and the 
like. Once again, there is nothing in Craig’s animadversions against Humean 
conceivability that rules out the invitation of Contingent Initial Boundary to a contest 
between serious theories about the overall shape of reality. 
 
3. Categorical Epistemology: The third type of argument that Craig advocates is 
based on a neo-Kantian conception of the operation of an a priori category of 
causality. If we suppose that our ability to make causal judgments draws upon an 
innate mental capacity that reflects the structure of reality, then—on Craig’s view—
we have good reason to conclude that reality does not have a contingently existing 
initial boundary.  
 
Even if we accept the controversial neo-Kantian assumptions that form the basis for 
this argument, it is clear that we have been given no good reason to suppose that 
reality does not have a contingently existing initial boundary. Since the initial 
boundary of reality is not something that could be given to us in experience, there is 
no reason to suppose that our a priori categories yield accurate judgments about it, 
even if we do suppose that our a priori categories yield accurate judgments about the 
part of reality that we inhabit. While this point could be buttressed by considerations 
about the evolutionary origins of our ‘a priori categories’, no further investigation is 
needed to underline the point that the argument that Craig advances here is entirely 
unconvincing. 
 
4. The ‘Edwards-Prior’ Argument: The final argument that Craig advocates draws on 
the writings of Jonathan Edwards and Arthur Prior: ‘If something can come into being 
uncaused out of nothing, then it is inexplicable why anything and everything cannot 
or does not do so. Hence it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a 
cause’ (‘Graham Oppy on the Kalām Cosmological Argument’, 1993, 7). 
 
Here is one way of seeing why this argument is entirely unpersuasive. Among 
possible existents, we can identify at least the following two kinds: those that can 
exist only if there is no part of reality that is prior to them under the privileged 
relation, and those that can exist only if there is a part of reality that is prior to them 
under the privileged relation. If we suppose that all possible existents fall into one or 
other of these two kinds, then we have what Craig claims it is impossible to have: an 
explanation of how it is that the initial boundary of reality is the only eligible part of 
reality that is not preceded by some other eligible part of reality under the privileged 
external relation, even though all parts of reality exist contingently.  
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Perhaps this argument can be clarified by applying it to a particular case. Suppose that 
we think that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard general relativistic 
universe that originates in an initial singularity. Then, for all that Craig has argued to 
the contrary, we are free to suppose that, apart from the initial singularity, every part 
of reality is brought into existence by a prior part of reality; and we are also free to 
suppose that it is impossible for there to be some part of reality other than the initial 
singularity that is not brought into existence by some prior part of reality. There is 
nothing in considerations about the impossibility of objects popping into existence 
within reality, where no such objects had previously existed within reality, that rules 
out the possibility that there is no cause of reality’s coming into existence. (I provide a 
much expanded version of the argument developed in this section in ‘Uncaused 
Existence’, forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy.) 
 
Given the weakness of Craig’s arguments against the hypothesis that the initial 
boundary of reality is a contingent existent—and given the absence of any more 
compelling arguments in favour of this claim—we have more than sufficient reason to 
insist that Contingent Initial Boundary should be invited to any contest between 
serious theories about the overall shape of reality. 
 
4 
 
If our argument to this point is good, then we have established that Craig has failed to 
show that Infinite Regress and Contingent Initial Boundary are defeated theories 
about the overall shape of reality. The various arguments that Craig produces do not 
establish that it is unnecessary to include these theories in serious discussion about the 
overall shape of reality. However, if this is right, then, as I shall now go on to argue, 
we actually have to hand the outline of a serious argument against theism, at least 
insofar as we consider only the data that is appealed to in cosmological arguments. 
 
Suppose we agree that the three most plausible contenders as accounts of the overall 
shape of reality are Infinite Regress, Contingent Initial Boundary, and Necessary 
Initial Boundary.  
 
If Infinite Regress is correct, then it seems that we have reason to prefer naturalism to 
theism, since it would be odd—if not impossible—to identify any eligible part of 
Infinite Regress with the God of theism. Perhaps we might try identifying some initial 
segment of reality—i.e. some segment with infinitely many eligible parts connected 
by the privileged external relation—with God. But, given that we are already 
supposing that reality has the structure of Infinite Regress, it seems that this 
identification brings with it a train of expensive ideological commitments that buy no 
additional explanatory power (at least insofar as we are only focussing on the mere 
existence of reality). 
 
Similarly, if Contingent Initial Boundary is correct, then it seems that we have reason 
to prefer naturalism to theism, since there is no explanatory advantage—in connection 
with the mere existence of reality— that is obtained by supposing that the 
contingently existing initial boundary is a person. Once again, the identification of the 
contingently existing initial boundary with God brings with it a train of expensive 
ideological commitments that buy no additional explanatory power (at least insofar as 
we are only focussing on the mere existence of reality). Of course, this is the basis of 
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the traditional ‘Who made God’ objection to cosmological arguments, a question 
which makes eminent sense under the supposition that the initial boundary of reality 
is a contingent existent. 
 
The remaining case is Necessary Initial Boundary. Here, again, it seems that we have 
reason to prefer naturalism to theism, since there is no explanatory advantage—in 
connection with the mere existence of reality—that is obtained by supposing that the 
necessarily existing initial boundary is a person. In this case, too, the identification of 
the necessarily existing initial boundary with God brings with it a train of expensive 
ideological commitments that buy no additional explanatory power (at least insofar as 
we are only focussing on the mere existence of reality). Perhaps, in this case, theists 
might be tempted to object that a necessarily existing person is intuitively more 
plausible than a necessarily existing non-person. But it seems clear to me that, insofar 
as we focus only on the considerations that are appealed to in cosmological 
arguments—e.g., insofar as we focus only on the mere existence of reality—this is 
manifestly untrue. 
 
I conclude that, insofar as we focus only on the considerations appealed to in 
cosmological arguments—e.g. insofar as we focus only on the mere existence of 
reality—we have good reason to prefer naturalism to theism. 
 
Naturally, I don’t say that we have here a compelling argument in favour of 
naturalism over theism. For all that has been argued here, it may be that, when we 
take other data into account—e.g. the data concerning the fine-tuning of the 
observable universe for life, or the data of religious experience, or the data of putative 
revelation, or the like—we will find that we have reason to prefer theism to 
naturalism.  
 
On the other hand, of course, I do actually believe that, when naturalists take all of the 
other data into account, they still have reason to prefer naturalism to theism: but, as I 
have just insisted, there is nothing in the considerations that I have advanced here that 
supports this further claim. What I claim to have shown here—contra Craig—is just 
that, viewed in isolation, considerations about the overall shape of reality plausibly 
favour naturalism over theism. 
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